NPA Commission Europe
Although it is too early to assess the implementation of this directive in France, it is possible to point out several problems:
Overall, the implementation of the directive, while it has the disadvantage of creating a new category of exiles with different rights, has the merit of having offered displaced persons from Ukraine new rights. Fortress Europe is therefore not inevitable. And the provision of resources, whatever the cost, is a question of political will. It remains to be seen how the opening of these rights could create a precedent. Many of the rights opened by temporary protection have been demanded by exile activists in France for years, to no avail. Moreover, the implementation of the directive reveals that the Dublin Regulation is once again unenforceable and is being overridden.
THE MAIN PROBLEM LIES IN ACCESS TO TEMPORARY PROTECTION
1) Non-Ukrainians who cannot return to their country in a safe and sustainable way will have to explain their situation at the prefecture counter and will be issued with a one-month APS, renewable until a response is received, as the APS does not open any rights. This vague clause suggests several problems: what criteria will be used to assess "safe and durable"? It seems that it is based on possible persecution but in no case on economic criteria or private and family life, especially in the case of loss of ties in the country of origin. Finally, the interpretation on a case-by-case basis may vary from one prefecture to another, and there is a potential danger of OQTFs being issued. This could concern many foreign students or workers in Ukraine coming to France.
2) Ukrainians living in France irregularly are excluded. Of course, they can apply for asylum and probably obtain subsidiary protection.
3) It is impossible to know what criteria the prefectures will use to assess the stability of the relationship with the partner in order to decide on the right to join the beneficiary of the temporary protection. There is a danger that these criteria will differ from one prefecture to another or that documents proving this stability will be required.
The demand to include these groups of people in the entitlement to temporary protection is legitimate and urgent. This would mean applying Article L581-7 of the CESEDA: "Under the conditions laid down in Article 7 of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, additional categories of displaced persons who are not referred to in the Council Decision provided for in Article 5 of the same directive may benefit from temporary protection when they are displaced for the same reasons and from the same country or region of origin. "
THE QUESTION OF DISTRIBUTION
EU countries should share out persons from Ukraine. This has not been decided, while countries like Spain and France receive a ridiculously low number compared to border countries within the EU or outside the EU like Poland and Moldova for example. At present, it is difficult to demand relocations of IDPs as they go to the countries of their choice and France and Spain are not attractive due to the small number of Ukrainians living there and therefore the ties for IDPs. On the other hand, it is imperative that EU countries and France in particular put pressure on the UK to grant visa-free travel to Ukrainians wishing to go there.
RUSSIANS AND BELARUSSIANS
The circular only concerns people from Ukraine, whereas the invasion has had dramatic consequences in Russia itself and in Belarus. It is true that Russian or Belarusian nationals, who are the forgotten ones in the system, will be able to apply for asylum once in France. French diplomatic representations in Russia and neighbouring countries should be required to issue them with asylum visas (D visas), which already exist but are granted at their discretion.
PERVERSE EFFECTS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE....
The saturation of available accommodation has led prefectures to rely heavily on the commitment of citizens to ensure that no one from Ukraine sleeps rough. However, the pressure could lead to discriminatory measures and threats to the accommodation of other categories of exiles, who are forced to live in tents all year round, and to the "reception" of the latter in the prefectures, which are understaffed. The same remark applies to the right to free transport.
FIRST POSITIONS AND MOBILISATIONS
Very early on, the associations that had requested and mobilised for the implementation of the directive in 2015 welcomed its transposition in France, but were concerned about its restrictive interpretation. The same is true of associations involved in solidarity with exiles. However, to date, there has been no mobilisation on all these demands.
Critical positions have been taken, including within LREM. Most of the criticisms focus on the ineligibility of "students", especially "Africans", for temporary protection. And in the wake of this, a series of mobilisations have developed, at the initiative of students who have demanded (Paris 1 and Paris 8) and sometimes obtained that university presidents, who are not always reticent, register non-Ukrainian students who have fled the conflict. These initial victories, recent in Aix-Marseille, Paris-Cité and Bordeaux, highlight the fact that registration must now be accompanied by a right to stay.
On the fringes of the implementation of the directive in France, another sector was mobilised: railway workers, first to demand free transport for "Ukrainian refugees". Once the free travel was acquired, some of them came back to the charge, notably through the CGT, which refused to sort out between people entitled to free transport and the others, fleeing Ukraine and not being able to present the necessary documents to travel for free.
These mobilisations make demands whose content does not derogate from the European directive itself, nor from its transposition in France. The proof is Spain, which has made a more generous interpretation
NPA Europe Commission, 15 May 2022 TOWARDS A FIRST ASSESSMENT
Although it is too early to assess the implementation of this directive in France, it is possible to point out several problems:
Overall, the implementation of the directive, if it has the disadvantage of creating a new category of exiles with different rights, has the merit of having offered displaced persons from Ukraine new rights. Fortress Europe is therefore not inevitable. And the provision of resources, whatever the cost, is a question of political will. It remains to be seen how the opening of these rights could create a precedent. Many of the rights opened by temporary protection have been demanded by exile activists in France for years, to no avail. Moreover, the implementation of the directive reveals that the Dublin Regulation is once again unenforceable and is being overridden.
THE MAIN PROBLEM LIES IN ACCESS TO TEMPORARY PROTECTION
1) Non-Ukrainians who cannot return to their country in a safe and sustainable way will have to explain their situation at the prefecture counter and will be issued with a one-month APS, renewable until a response is received, as the APS does not open any rights. This vague clause suggests several problems: what criteria will be used to assess "safe and durable"? It seems that it is based on possible persecution but in no case on economic criteria or private and family life, especially in the case of loss of ties in the country of origin. Finally, the interpretation on a case-by-case basis may vary from one prefecture to another, and there is a potential danger of OQTFs being issued. This could concern many foreign students or workers in Ukraine coming to France.
2) Ukrainians living in France irregularly are excluded. Of course, they can apply for asylum and probably obtain subsidiary protection.
3) It is impossible to know what criteria the prefectures will use to assess the stability of the relationship with the partner in order to decide on the right to join the beneficiary of the temporary protection. There is a danger that these criteria will differ from one prefecture to another or that documents proving this stability will be required.
The demand to include these groups of people in the entitlement to temporary protection is legitimate and urgent. This would mean applying Article L581-7 of the CESEDA: "Under the conditions laid down in Article 7 of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, additional categories of displaced persons who are not referred to in the Council Decision provided for in Article 5 of the same directive may benefit from temporary protection when they are displaced for the same reasons and from the same country or region of origin. "
THE QUESTION OF DISTRIBUTION
EU countries should share out persons from Ukraine. This has not been decided, while countries like Spain and France receive a ridiculously low number compared to border countries within the EU or outside the EU like Poland and Moldova for example. At present, it is difficult to demand relocations of IDPs as they go to the countries of their choice and France and Spain are not attractive due to the small number of Ukrainians living there and therefore the ties for IDPs. On the other hand, it is imperative that EU countries and France in particular put pressure on the UK to grant visa-free travel to Ukrainians wishing to go there.
RUSSIANS AND BELARUSSIANS
The circular only concerns people from Ukraine, whereas the invasion has had dramatic consequences in Russia itself and in Belarus. It is true that Russian or Belarusian nationals, who are the forgotten ones in the system, will be able to apply for asylum once in France. French diplomatic representations in Russia and neighbouring countries should be required to issue them with asylum visas (D visas), which already exist but are granted at their discretion.
PERVERSE EFFECTS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DIRECTIVE....
The saturation of available accommodation has led prefectures to rely heavily on the commitment of citizens to ensure that no one from Ukraine sleeps rough. However, the pressure could lead to discriminatory measures and threats to the accommodation of other categories of exiles, who are forced to live in tents all year round, and to the "reception" of the latter in the prefectures, which are understaffed. The same remark applies to the right to free transport.
FIRST POSITIONS AND MOBILISATIONS
Very early on, the associations that had requested and mobilised for the implementation of the directive in 2015 welcomed its transposition in France, but were concerned about its restrictive interpretation. The same is true of associations involved in solidarity with exiles. However, to date, there has been no mobilisation on all these demands.
Critical positions have been taken, including within LREM. Most of the criticisms focus on the ineligibility of "students", especially "Africans", for temporary protection. And in the wake of this, a series of mobilisations have developed, at the initiative of students who have demanded (Paris 1 and Paris 8) and sometimes obtained that university presidents, who are not always reticent, register non-Ukrainian students who have fled the conflict. These initial victories, recent in Aix-Marseille, Paris-Cité and Bordeaux, highlight the fact that registration must now be accompanied by a right to stay.
On the fringes of the implementation of the directive in France, another sector was mobilised: railway workers, first to demand free transport for "Ukrainian refugees". Once the free travel was acquired, some of them came back to the charge, notably through the CGT, which refused to sort out between people entitled to free transport and the others, fleeing Ukraine and not being able to present the necessary documents to travel for free.
These mobilisations make demands whose content does not derogate from the European directive itself, nor from its transposition in France. The proof is Spain, which has made a more generous interpretation
NPA Europe Commission, 15 May 2022