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Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Kosenko: Make Russia Pay for Its War on Ukraine
December 3, 2025
As the Belgian government digs in in its resistance to making €140 billion in frozen Russian assets available to a Ukraine desperately in need of them, the following comment by Nobel winning economist Joseph Stiglitz and Andrew Kosenko in Project Syndicate tells a vital truth: "If there ever were a time to tighten the screws on Russia, this is it." Now read on, but not before signing this petition demanding that Belgium make the frozen Russian assets available to Ukraine.
November 28, 2025 I by JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ and ANDREW KOSENKO
NEW YORK - As the fourth anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine approaches, the European Union has yet to take one of the most powerful steps that would make a real difference on the ground in Ukraine: use frozen Russian assets to help Ukraine fight off Russia's army. Doing so would go a long way toward securing Ukraine's future - and Europe's, too.
This week, French President Emmanuel Macron confirmed that EU countries will finalize a solution for financial support of Ukraine in the coming days. As Russia continues to pummel Ukraine's civilian infrastructure - homes, power generation and distribution systems, and heating and water systems - the need for financial support is great. Even if the war ends in 2026, and without considering the enormous costs of reconstruction, amounting to well over$500 billion, Ukraine will need around $140 billion in the next two years, in addition to other financing, owing to the war's effects on its economy.
Ukraine continues to resist valiantly, fighting the much bigger invader to a virtual standstill. Russian casualties (killed and wounded) exceed one million. Yet the loss of so many lives has gained Russia relatively little - devastated territories and populations, land laid waste by some of the fiercest fighting since World War II and now strewn with mines. Russia has failed to achieve any of its original strategic goals in launching the war.
In February 2022, soon after Russia's full-scale invasion, $300 billion in Russian central bank assets (mostly interest-paying securities) were immobilized in Western financial institutions. In October 2024, the G7 countries established an Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) program, providing loans to Ukraine financed by interest from those immobilized Russian assets. Under the ERA program, about €30.9 billion ($35.7 billion) of the planned €45 billion loan envelope has been disbursed so far.
But what about the underlying assets immobilized in European jurisdictions? Many have matured into cash, which Euroclear - the Belgian financial institution that holds the lion's share of the assets - has been placing in an account at the European Central Bank bearing very little interest.
A recent EU Council meeting discussed using these assets to make a "Reparations Loan" to Ukraine, in the amount of €210 billion, repayable only if Russia compensates Ukraine for the destruction it has caused. In practical terms, the only difference would be that Euroclear invests the cash in AAA-rated Commission bonds instead of AAA-rated ECB deposits. Russia could, in principle, reclaim ownership of these assets after it repays Ukraine, making the Reparations Loan temporary and reversible.
As we previously argued, there is no risk of this being perceived as "confiscation." None of the adverse effects that critics of immobilization and the ERA program predicted materialized.
The euro is still second only to the dollar, and European financial institutions are a safe haven for investors across the world.
While Russia has created the most serious security crisis in Europe since WWII's end, trampling on international law and norms, its assets have been enjoying the protection of European institutions. But in any just world, one cannot have it both ways. One cannot attack Europe with GPS jamming, arson, sabotage, cyberwarfare, and disinformation campaigns - all orchestrated by Russian military intelligence - while enjoying the protection of European financial and legal institutions.
If there ever were a time to tighten the screws on Russia, this is it. With oil and gas revenues down sharply, Russia is finding it harder and harder to pay for its meatgrinder war. Meanwhile, defense expenditures are rising, and high inflation is severely hurting Russian consumers.
As a result of US secondary sanctions, India's largest conglomerate halted Russian oil imports. Four major Chinese state oil companies have also signaled that they will refrain from buying Russian oil in the short term. China and India together account for about 85% of Russian oil sales, and a loss of these markets would have a severe impact on the Russian war effort. It is thus no surprise that Russia is rushing to force an end to the war on favorable terms.
To share residual risk of the Reparations Loan, Belgian Prime Minister Bart de Wever has demanded guarantees from other EU states that Belgium will not be liable for any successful award to the Russian Federation. Thus, each member state is to guarantee a share of the loan (based on gross national income).
De Wever's concerns are ungrounded. Given the grave violations of the United Nations Charter and the scale of Russian war crimes, there is no path to a successful arbitration or award to Russia that Belgium would have to repay. The immobilization happened because of EU law, and the European Council already limited the enforcement of any potential awards in 2014, in response to Russia's first invasion of Ukraine, when Russia illegally annexed Crimea.
Even so, if loan guarantees from EU member states are what is required to clear this hurdle, they should be provided to the necessary extent. Since Belgium is not at risk, there is no risk for guarantee providers. Furthermore, European countries should terminate their bilateral investment treaties with Russia - something they should have done long ago. Russia has already effectively done this by taking over so many European companies [emphasis added].
As many European leaders acknowledge, Europe (including the United Kingdom and Norway) must be able to defend itself. Providing a Reparations Loan to Ukraine is a forceful step in this direction that Europeans can take without American involvement.
It would be morally wrong not to pursue this option. Russia is culpable for the carnage it has wrought in Ukraine. A reparations loan would bring a modicum of justice, although the amount represents only a small fraction of the damage to physical infrastructure Russia has caused, to say nothing of the harm caused to millions of Ukrainians. An entire generation will carry the trauma with them for the rest of their lives.
The Reparations Loan is not only about justice. It is about survival. To defend Ukraine is to defend Europe. Europe must overcome its fear of exercising power if it is to withstand the clear, present, and deadly threat emanating from Moscow.
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Andrew Kosenko: Putin soll für seinen Angriffskrieg zahlen
Es ist Zeit, dass Europa das eingefrorene Vermögen für den Wiederaufbau der Ukraine freigibt. Das würde ein Mindestmaß an Gerechtigkeit schaffen
Joseph E. Stiglitz, Wirtschaftsnobelpreisträger und Professor an der Columbia University, und der Wirtschaftswissenschafter Andrew Kosenko plädieren in ihrem Gastkommentar dafür, das in Europa eingefrorene Vermögen Russlands für die Ukraine zu verwenden.
Kurz vor dem vierten Jahrestag der russischen Invasion in der Ukraine hat die Europäische Union eine der effektivsten Maßnahmen, die vor Ort in der Ukraine wirklich etwas bewirken würde, noch immer nicht ergriffen: nämlich die Nutzung eingefrorener russischer Vermögenswerte, um der Ukraine im Kampf gegen die russische Armee beizustehen. Dies wäre ein wichtiger Beitrag zur Sicherung der Zukunft der Ukraine – und auch Europas.
Da Russland weiterhin die zivile Infrastruktur der Ukraine verwüstet – Wohnhäuser, Elektrizitätswerke und Stromnetze sowie Heizungs- und Wasserversorgungssysteme –, ist der Bedarf an finanzieller Unterstützung groß. Unabhängig von den enormen Kosten für den Wiederaufbau, die sich auf weit über 500 Milliarden Dollar belaufen: Selbst, wenn der Krieg 2026 enden sollte, wird die Ukraine aufgrund der Auswirkungen des Krieges auf ihre Wirtschaft in den nächsten zwei Jahren zusätzlich zu anderen Finanzmitteln rund 140 Milliarden Dollar benötigen.
Entsetzen und Trauer nach einem russischen Angriff auf ein Wohnhaus in Kyjiw. AFP/GENYA SAVILOV
Die Ukraine leistet weiterhin tapfer Widerstand und kämpft gegen den viel größeren Angreifer, dessen Vorstoß sie praktisch zum Stillstand gebracht hat. Die russischen Opferzahlen (Tote und Verwundete) übersteigen eine Million. Doch trotz des Verlusts so vieler Menschenleben hat Russland relativ wenig erreicht – devastierte Gebiete und demoralisierte Bevölkerungen, durch die heftigsten Kämpfe seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg in Schutt und Asche gelegte Landstriche, mittlerweile auch mit Minen übersät.
Schwerste Sicherheitskrise
Im Februar 2022, kurz nach der vollständigen russischen Invasion, wurden Vermögenswerte der russischen Zentralbank in Höhe von 300 Milliarden US-Dollar – hauptsächlich verzinsliche Wertpapiere – in westlichen Finanzinstitutionen eingefroren. Im Oktober 2024 richteten die G7-Staaten ein Programm zur beschleunigten Nutzung außerordentlicher Einnahmen (ERA) ein, das der Ukraine Kredite gewährt, die aus den Zinsen dieser eingefrorenen russischen Vermögenswerte gespeist werden. Im Rahmen des ERA-Programms wurden bisher etwa 30,9 Milliarden Euro des geplanten Kreditvolumens von 45 Milliarden Euro ausgezahlt.
Was aber ist mit den zugrunde liegenden Vermögenswerten, die in europäischen Ländern eingefroren sind? Viele sind inzwischen fällig geworden und liegen als Barmittel vor, die Euroclear – die belgische Finanzinstitution, die den Löwenanteil der Vermögenswerte hält – auf ein gering verzinstes Konto bei der Europäischen Zentralbank eingezahlt hat.
Auf einer der jüngsten Sitzungen des Europäischen Rates wurde die Verwendung dieser Vermögenswerte für ein "Reparationsdarlehen" an die Ukraine in Höhe von 210 Milliarden Euro diskutiert. Dieses Darlehen wäre nur dann rückzahlbar, wenn Russland der Ukraine Reparationen für die von ihm verursachten Zerstörungen leistet.
Obwohl Russland die schwerste Sicherheitskrise in Europa seit dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs herbeigeführt und internationales Recht sowie internationale Normen mit Füßen getreten hat, genießen seine Vermögenswerte den Schutz europäischer Institutionen. Doch in einer gerechten Welt kann man nicht beides haben. Man kann nicht Europa mit GPS-Störsignalen, Brandstiftung, Sabotage, Cyberkrieg und Desinformationskampagnen attackieren – allesamt orchestriert vom russischen Militärgeheimdienst – und gleichzeitig den Schutz europäischer Finanz- und Rechtsinstitutionen genießen.
Wenn es jemals einen Zeitpunkt gab, Russland die Daumenschrauben anzulegen, dann jetzt. Angesichts stark gesunkener Öl- und Gaseinnahmen fällt es Russland immer schwerer, seinen Abnützungskrieg zu finanzieren. Unterdessen steigen die Verteidigungsausgaben, und die hohe Inflation trifft die russischen Verbraucher hart.
Unbegründete Bedenken
Infolge der sekundären Sanktionen der USA hat Indiens größter Mischkonzern die Ölimporte aus Russland eingestellt. Vier große staatliche chinesische Ölkonzerne haben ebenfalls signalisiert, dass sie kurzfristig vom Kauf russischen Öls absehen werden. Auf China und Indien entfallen zusammen etwa 85 Prozent der russischen Ölverkäufe, und der Verlust dieser Märkte hätte schwerwiegende Auswirkungen auf die russischen Kriegsanstrengungen.
Um das Restrisiko im Zusammenhang mit dem Reparationsdarlehen zu teilen, hat der belgische Premierminister Bart De Wever von anderen EU-Staaten Garantien verlangt, dass Belgien nicht allein für etwaige der Russischen Föderation zugesprochene Ansprüche haftet. Somit soll jeder Mitgliedsstaat einen Teil des Darlehens – basierend auf dem jeweiligen Bruttonationaleinkommen – garantieren.
Die Bedenken De Wevers sind unbegründet. Angesichts der schweren Verstöße gegen die Charta der Vereinten Nationen und des Ausmaßes der russischen Kriegsverbrechen besteht keine Möglichkeit für ein positives Schiedsurteil oder eine Entschädigungszahlung an Russland, die Belgien zurückzahlen müsste. Die Immobilisierung der Vermögenswerte erfolgte auf der Grundlage des EU-Rechts, und der Europäische Rat hat bereits 2014 als Reaktion auf die erste Invasion Russlands in der Ukraine, als Russland die Krim illegal annektierte, die Vollstreckung möglicher Entschädigungszahlungen eingeschränkt.
Kein Risiko
Falls jedoch Kreditgarantien von EU-Staaten erforderlich sind, um diese Hürde zu nehmen, sollten diese Garantien in dem erforderlichen Umfang gewährt werden. Da Belgien kein Risiko eingeht, besteht auch kein Risiko für die Garantiegeber.
Es wäre moralisch falsch, diese Option nicht zu verfolgen. Russland ist für das Blutbad in der Ukraine verantwortlich. Ein Reparationsdarlehen würde ein Mindestmaß an Gerechtigkeit schaffen, auch wenn der Betrag nur einen kleinen Bruchteil des von Russland verursachten Schadens an der physischen Infrastruktur ausmacht, ganz zu schweigen von dem Leid, das Millionen Menschen in der Ukraine zugefügt wurde. Eine ganze Generation wird das Trauma für den Rest ihres Lebens mit sich tragen.
Bei diesem Reparationsdarlehen geht es nicht nur um Gerechtigkeit, sondern um Überleben. Die Ukraine zu verteidigen heißt, Europa zu verteidigen. Europa muss seine Angst vor Machtausübung überwinden, wenn es der deutlichen, aktuellen und tödlichen Bedrohung aus Moskau standhalten will. (Joseph E. Stiglitz, Andrew Kosenko, Übersetzung: Helga Klinger-Groier, Copyright: Project Syndicate, 3.12.2025)
Joseph E. Stiglitz ist Nobelpreisträger für Wirtschaftswissenschaften, ehemaliger Chefökonom der Weltbank, ehemaliger Vorsitzender des wirtschaftlichen Beraterstabs des US-Präsidenten, Universitätsprofessor an der Columbia University und Verfasser des zuletzt erschienenen Buchs "Der Weg zur Freiheit – Ökonomie für eine gerechte Gesellschaft" (Siedler-Verlag, 2025). Andrew Kosenko ist Assistenzprofessor für Wirtschaftswissenschaften an der School of Management des Marist College.
The European Commission's proposal on Euroclear is in line with international law
This article was written by: Francis Biesmans, professor emeritus (Université de Lorraine); Samuel Cogolati, doctor of international law (KU Leuven); Paul De Grauwe, professor (London School of Economics) and De Morgen columnist; Pierre Klein, professor (Center for International Law, ULB); André Lange, member of the board of directors of the association Pour l’Ukraine, pour leur liberté et la nôtre; Gerard Roland, professor of political science (UC Berkeley and ULB).
Published on December 4, 2025
How to finance aid to Ukraine? An answer was given in March by 140 Nobel Prize winners. In an open letter, they called on governments holding frozen Russian assets to “release these funds to finance the reconstruction of Ukraine and compensate war victims, so that the country can be quickly rebuilt once a peace agreement has been concluded.”
Since October, the European Commission has been promoting a proposal along the same lines: a €140 billion recovery fund to be allocated to Ukraine and guaranteed by the Russian Central Bank's assets, which have been frozen since 2022. In principle, Russia could regain ownership of these assets once peace has been signed and the debt to Ukraine has been settled, making the reparations temporary and reversible.
However, during the European Council meeting on October 23, Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever opposed this plan. Belgium is one of the countries most affected: a company under Belgian law, Euroclear, manages a large part of the Russian assets frozen in Europe, namely €193 billion. De Wever expressed doubts about the legality of such a measure in light of international law and a bilateral treaty between Belgium and the Russian Federation. In addition, he wanted—not without reason—to avoid Belgium being the only country to bear the risks of such a decision.
These objections should have been dispelled on November 24, when Commission President Ursula von der Leyen told the European Parliament that the legislative proposal to be submitted to the next European Council (December 18-19) was based on “solid legal grounds.” However, on November 27, De Wever confirmed his opposition in a letter to the Commission President, this time with a new argument: the Commission's proposal could disrupt the conclusion of the “peace agreement” currently under discussion.
Internationally unlawful act
Several legal experts have long refuted the argument of alleged illegality under international law. After all, Russia was recognized by the United Nations General Assembly as responsible for the aggression against Ukraine. That country therefore falls within the scope of what customary international law has established under the term “responsibility of states for internationally wrongful acts”. The legality of the proposed re-establishment is based on this codification, drawn up by the UN Commission on International Law, which grants states the right to take countermeasures in response to an internationally wrongful act.
The bilateral investment treaty that Belgium and Luxembourg concluded with the USSR in 1989 is considered a risk by the Belgian government. However, it is highly doubtful whether this treaty, which regulates investment disputes, applies to Russian assets in a bank account with Euroclear. We therefore consider it highly unlikely that Russia would be able to use this treaty to challenge a European decision.
The Prime Minister's request to mutualize the risks is understandable. It would not be fair if Belgium were the only country to bear the potential financial consequences of a European decision. That is why, on December 3, the European Commission announced strong protective measures that should address Belgium's concerns. Other European countries that are not members of the EU could also contribute to the risk coverage.
Peace process in danger?
One of the Belgian government's main arguments is that central banks and investors would lose confidence in Euroclear, Belgium, the European Union, and the eurozone. However, this argument needs to be nuanced. The measures under consideration do not target ordinary assets, but those of a state recognized by the United Nations General Assembly as responsible for armed aggression. Fortunately, such “internationally unlawful acts” are rare, and the countermeasures that follow are therefore not intended to be generalized. Moreover, two rating agencies have recently concluded that the decision would have no impact on the creditworthiness of European states.
One might also wonder whether publicly expressing fears of reputational damage does not actually reinforce these concerns. Invoking reputational risk in this context amounts to arguing that one should refrain from freezing the bank accounts of drug traffickers or proceeds from corruption for fear that other users of the banking system would be concerned about the safety of their assets. What determines the reputation of a financial system is its ability to distinguish between legal and illegal assets and to treat the latter in accordance with the law.
The Belgian government's new argument—that a decision by the European Union would jeopardize the current peace process—is implausible. The American plan provides that Russian assets frozen in Europe would simply be released. In doing so, the plan pretends that the peace process is exclusively in the hands of the two protagonists and relieves Russia of any obligation to pay compensation. This would mean that most of the cost of reconstruction would ultimately be borne by Western taxpayers rather than Russia.
Giving up leverage
Furthermore, there is no indication that Russia will emerge victorious from the war, as military experts emphasize. Making the European position dependent on such an uncertain scenario would amount to needlessly relinquishing an important means of pressure and turning our backs on a fundamental principle of international law: a state that commits aggression cannot expect peace to be established on its terms, without reparations to the victims.
The European Commission's proposal is in line with international law. The mutualization of risks is likely to be confirmed. It would be particularly regrettable if Belgium, by not joining the European decision, were to help undermine the necessary support for Ukraine.
De Wever Overstates Belgium’s Risks — Why the Reparations Loan Is Crucial
By Andrii Mikheiev (International Centre for Ukrainian Victory)
[Belgian] Prime Minister De Wever has repeatedly dramatized the legal, financial, and political risks Belgium might face if frozen Russian assets are used to support Ukraine. While caution is understandable, his assessment exaggerates the dangers and overlooks the unique opportunity the Reparations Loan offers. Accepting this initiative is both legal and strategically necessary.
1. Legality Concerns
De Wever’s Argument: “Is it legal at least? It is a stretch… Nobody has ever done this before.”
Counterpoint:
- Since 2022, leading international law experts have confirmed that using frozen Russian state assets as a countermeasure is legitimate under customary international law (Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts — ARSIWA).
- Similar measures had never been applied before, yet novel countermeasures are lawful when proportional and temporary.
- Most international courts, except for some investment tribunals, lack jurisdiction over disputes with Russia or its Central Bank.
First of all, yes it is indeed legal. Since 2022 prominent world experts on international law have substantially grounded that use of frozen Russian assets would be a legitimate countermeasure according to the rules of the international customary law, aggregated in the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) applied based on the fact that Russia fails to fulfill its obligations as violator and aggressor: stop the aggression and compensate for losses. Indeed, the measures of such kind have never been applied but the same could be said about many kinds of countermeasures before they were successfully applied. At least, use of Russian state assets may successfully comply with all the requirements and criteria of countermeasures including proportionality and temporality (as used or confiscated amount may successfully be netted from the general number of reparations due to payment by the Russian Federation). At the same time based on the numerous comprehensive analyses, the absolute majority of international courts (except for investment tribunals) hardly even have jurisdiction to consider disputes with Russia or Russian Central Bank.
2. Debunking the myth that using Russian assets is impossible: the EU itself created the precedents.
When it comes to protecting investors of the EU depositories and businesses at the expense of Russian assets, Belgium, Euroclear, and the EU in general have already demonstrated remarkable flexibility and willingness to take risks, even in legally and financially questionable circumstances, pertaining to confiscation of Russian private assets.
- In December 2024, amendments to the EU CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) decisions and corresponding regulations allowed the use of cash balances attributable to the Russian National Securities Depository and other sanctioned Russian entities to compensate European Central Securities Depositories’ investors for losses caused by Russia’s hostile actions. In July 2025, the Council decided to prohibit the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and court decisions in the EU related to investor–state disputes over such EU measures.
3. The reparations-backed loan is a key to bringing a sustainable peace closer.
Putin is openly declaring that he has no intention of engaging in any genuine peace negotiations or making any concessions, because he has no incentive to stop the aggression. Russia’s war machine is operating at full capacity, and it is impossible to quickly shift its economy back to peacetime — which makes the continuation of the war strategically advantageous for him.
Moreover, Putin is counting on “outlasting” Western assistance — the depletion of Ukraine’s resources and Europe’s fatigue are central elements of his strategy. A two-year, predictable financing package backed by frozen Russian assets completely breaks this plan, depriving the Kremlin of the illusion that it can simply wait for support to collapse.
A stronger Ukrainian defence, funded through the reparations-backed loan, will force Russia to take peace seriously and work on an actual peace plan rather than a list of demands. Only when Ukraine has the resources to deter Russia for another two years will the Kremlin be compelled to seriously consider the conditions for a just peace rather than pushing pseudo-negotiations and manipulation.
Therefore, the mechanism for using frozen Russian assets makes the war more costly for Russia and accelerates the emergence of real conditions for peace.
4. Risk Exposure / Liability
De Wever’s Argument: “Taking Putin’s money and leaving the risks with us. That’s not going to happen.”
Counterpoint:
- Analysis shows investment tribunal risks are extremely low. Bilateral Investment Treaties (e.g., Belgium-Luxembourg-Soviet Union 1989 BIT) provide general language but the Central Bank of Russia’s chances of winning a claim are minimal.
- EU measures (2024–2025) already protect against potential claims and set precedent for using frozen assets legally.
- The Reparations Loan is structured so Ukraine repays only after receiving compensation from Russia — no additional risk to Member States.
As for the fears of De Wever of risks of being defeated in the investment tribunal, they are not actually based on real arguments and researches, just plain suggestions.
First of all the 1989 BIT between Belgium & Luxembourg (BLEU) on the one side and Soviet Union on another side (succeeded by Russia) indeed has very general and extensive language which may allow the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to be admitted to the dispute as ”investor” (but not for sure, as CBR is also a constitutional state authority). But talking on the merits of the possible case the chances for the CBR to win are extremely low, based on the analysis of the related case law due to the following general reasons:
- The number of effective arbitration awards follow the general approach firstly established by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the investment dispute should not be considered separately from the general international law. Therefore, violation by Russia of the peremptory rules of international law and role of CBR in Russian aggression shall be taken into account by the tribunal as well as actions with Russian assets in response;
- Application of countermeasures is considered by the investment tribunals as “indeed available to responding States in international investment proceedings. A host State is entitled under general international law to react to another State’s breach of an international obligation by temporarily suspending its protection of the latter’s investors within its territory, in accordance with the requirements for a lawful countermeasure under customary international law”
- Analysis of the case law of the international investment tribunals provides that tribunals clearly differ compensable and non-compensableexpropriation of property, which means that the state is not obliged tocompensate the investor for the expropriated property if such procedurecomplies with the following criteria: whether the measure is within the recognized police powers of the host State; the (public) purpose and effect of the measure; whether the measure is discriminatory; the proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized; bona fide nature of the measure. Considering this, possible use of Russian frozen assets may also be successfully grounded as a justified non-compensable expropriation normally used against the investor from the aggressor’s state.
However, we may not but stress that all the arguments above are worth consideration just in case assets are actually taken, which is not a subject of the “reparation loan” proposal. This proposal provides for Ukrainian funding backed by Ukraine’s rights for reparations and assets shall be used just as additional securing guarantee.
Finally, the examples of existing investment claims from Fridman and others are not the same story as the frozen CBR assets and these risks have been even more extended by the EU’s own actions. For instance, in December 2024, amendments to the EU CFSP decisions and corresponding regulations allowed the use of cash balances attributable to the Russian National Securities Depository and other sanctioned Russian entities to compensate European CSDs’ investors for losses caused by Russia’s hostile actions. These decisive actions increased the risks of successful litigation by Russian in investment arbitrations as: 1. Russian individuals and companies may invoke human rights’ protection under European rules – which covers not only individuals but also non-governmental organizations (companies). This may not be applied by the CBR as a 100% governmental organization; 2. The connection between Russian individuals and companies with launch and conduct of the aggression is not so obvious, as in the CBR’s case, and would require detailed proof. However, these risks did not prevent Belgium and EU in general to impose such rules, unlike the CBR’s case.
Also, in July 2025, the Council of the EU decided to prohibit the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards and court decisions in the EU related to investor–state disputes over such EU measures. Actually, this move is not so pure from the legal point of view (such provisions have never been elaborated before in a way they automatically block recognition and enforcement of any of such decisions). However, if they are already taken, why may something similar not be enacted with regard to the possible investment awards on CBR assets and eliminate arbitration risks?
5. Revenue / Tax Implications
De Wever’s View: He expressed relief at the prospect of disposing of the frozen funds.
Counterpoint:
- Frozen Russian assets can directly fund Ukraine, including military needs, without impacting Belgian taxpayers.
- Ursula von der Leyen’s proposals offer three viable financing options, with the Reparations Loan providing timely, concessional, and scaleable support linked to immobilized assets
6. Strategic Imperative
De Wever’s Concern: Belgium may face political backlash or be held liable.
Counterpoint:
- Ukraine’s financing gap for 2026–2027 exceeds EUR 135 billion, including military and state needs.
- Immediate and sufficient support is critical to maintain Ukraine’s defense, protect Europe, and pressure Russia to cease hostilities.
- Delaying support weakens Europe’s security, while the Reparations Loan allows rapid mobilization without increasing EU borrowing or Member States’ debt.
7. Trade and Geopolitical Risks
De Wever’s Argument: He frames potential use of assets as “transactionalism and imperialism” that could undermine Europe’s ability to engage with MERCOSUR, Asia, and Africa — the countries “that still like the rule of law and normal leadership.”
Counterpoint: Many of these countries have histories of dictatorship and economic ties with Russia, making De Wever’s framing inconsistent.
Supporting Ukraine strengthens Europe’s security and credibility without undermining trade relations.
In his speech Mr DeWever almost directly characterizes the possible decision on assets as a gesture of “transactionalism and imperialism” opposing it to the part of the world which “… still likes the rule of law and normal leadership…” referring before to the states of MERCOSUR, Asian and African states, a lot from which have a long history of dictatorship regimes and are within the sphere of Russian economic influence.
Conclusion
While De Wever dramatizes Belgium’s exposure, the legal, financial, and political frameworks already mitigate most risks. Accepting the Reparations Loan is not only lawful but strategically essential for Ukraine and Europe. The EU must act decisively to provide predictable, timely, and scalable support.
Additionally, on 17 November, President von der Leyen circulated a letter outlining the three options the European Commission is currently considering to close Ukraine’s massive financing gap for 2026–2027. They include: (1) direct grants from Member States; (2) an EU-backed limited-recourse loan funded through Union borrowing; and (3) a limited-recourse loan backed by the cash balances of immobilised Russian sovereign assets.
Among these, the Reparations Loan clearly emerges as the most cost-effective and strategically sound option without placing overly pressure on national budgets of the Member States. From the three available choices, the Reparations Loan offers the cheapest, fastest, and most coherent path to ensuring Ukraine’s financial and defence resilience in 2026–2027.