When the alliance with the US fails – what should Denmark and the left do?

How shall we defend ourselves when Trump fails us? That question is currently filling the newspapers, and in a short time, many years of stable security policy can change. This applies to both high politics – including the leadership of major European countries – and that of the left.

Should the left unilaterally advocate disarmament and oppose all weapons, or should it advocate buying weapons and having an army in some way – and if so, how and in alliance with whom?

The left needs new answers on how to live safely and peacefully. But there are problems and dilemmas, so we must not skip intermediate calculations and reach hasty conclusions.

There have been several interesting articles in Solidaritet. One of them is Per Clausen and Jakob Ruggaard's column "The US's failure of Ukraine and Europe requires new offensive solutions from the left".

Another is the coverage of SF's security policy presentation, which Jonas Neivelt presented at the same time in "Ugen på Venstrefløjen". There you can also find a link to a column that SF's top people had in Jyllands-Posten in mid-February. The discussion is also raging in other newspapers.

The left wing at a crossroads

The left has a choice and faces a crossroads. Part of the left believes and will continue to believe that disarmament is by definition left-wing, and that the left must oppose all weapons production, all use of weapons, and therefore must be a kind of pacifist.

It is a view that has the advantage of being morally sound, easy to defend and reasonably logical. It has the great weakness that it does not answer the problems "we" face – for example, how a country can defend itself when attacked by an imperialist superpower. The demand for "peace" has thus been used to refuse to show solidarity with Ukraine by sending weapons.

When Ukraine was attacked by Russia three years ago, the two major left-wing parties in Denmark, the Socialist Party and the Unity Party, chose to support Denmark supporting Ukraine with weapons. So it is also logical that the weapons must be produced somewhere. In a world with large imperialist powers that want control and can attack other countries, it can be very dangerous to be unarmed.

In the words of Pia Olsen Dyhr, there is a need to increase arms production in the EU. She advocates:

"Increase cooperation in the EU on joint defence production – so that we get more defence for the money through joint investments."

The same conclusion is reached by Per Clausen and Jakob Ruggaard, as well as the Red and Greens' group leader Peder Hvelplund - with slightly more elaborate expressions.

"The US will not defend us"

The problem is true enough, as Jakob and Per describe it: European countries cannot count on the United States to defend us. This has become clear with the policy that Donald Trump has so clearly demonstrated in recent weeks – with threats to attack Greenland, with other military threats, the start of trade wars not only with China, but also with Mexico and Canada, and with one on the way towards the EU.

Most recently, we have also seen that Trump has withdrawn arms supplies for Ukraine's defence against Russia. The US has also stopped sharing intelligence with Ukraine. Trump has ambitions to end the war together with Putin and dictate the outcome to Ukraine.

Per Clausen and Jacob Ruggaard elaborate: "First of all, we must face the fact that we are surrounded by imperialist powers with annexation plans and territorial expansion ambitions. Trump's USA currently has its eyes firmly fixed on Greenland, Canada and Panama.

"You have to take their wishes for enlargement quite literally if you don't want to risk being left naive and unprepared. Putin's Russia has its eyes set on Moldova, Georgia and the Baltics."

The top of the SF (Pia Olsen Dyhr, Villy Søvndahl, Lisbeth Bech-Nielsen, Karsten Hønge and Anne Valentina Bertelsen) is in line with this and writes in Jyllands-Posten on February 14: "This results in an increasingly urgent need to ensure that European countries can defend themselves."

A picture emerges that the left is in favour of Europe defending itself against "imperialism."

Denmark has no weapons production

One thing must be clear: Denmark does not have what it takes to defend itself.

The company Terma produces parts for F-35 aircraft, but there is no independent weapons production in Denmark. If we are to have it, it is a long-term task. Establishing even a medium-sized production of machine guns, with cartridges or artillery shells, is something that takes time.

Should we establish weapons production in Denmark itself? It's a new, border-crossing policy for the left, so maybe we should think it over before we go for it. Although I myself would probably be inclined to say yes.

But Denmark is also a country that is far too small to produce all the necessary weapons ourselves. In Denmark today, we also do not have the industrial base that larger weapons production requires. So if we are going to produce weapons, we have to cooperate with others – but with whom?

Support for military production and defence in the Nordic region and Europe

Then we must produce the weapons "in the Nordic countries and Europe." This is what Jakob Ruggaard and Per Clausen, for example, believe. They write:

"Here we must realise that if we want to win the opportunity for security policy autonomy, it requires investments. In our security. In the military. Also in weapons and military production in Europe, the Nordic countries, Denmark. So that we can make ourselves independent of the USA and its capricious and hostile dictates. Something that the left has – rightly – long agitated for, but which we have not had a policy that has been able to make possible in practice."

Peder Hvelplund, who is the group leader for the Red-Green Alliance's parliamentary group, believes the same in a Facebook post with the admonishing headline: "Democracy is under threat. Let's promise each other to defend it together!"

He elaborates: A firewall must be built around welfare, climate and environmental efforts. Therefore, we must build on NATO cooperation, even if the United States does not want to join. So we must defend ourselves together with Europe and the European part of NATO:

"It is crucial for Denmark that we begin work on establishing and strengthening cooperation with alliance partners who are willing to defend the international legal order. This will initially mean in very close cooperation with our Nordic neighbours, but probably also in a form of European pillar in a disappearing NATO."

Let alone the fact that there has never really been anything that could be called an "international legal order." The big states have never adhered to any rules. But can we really believe that European countries in NATO will defend "welfare, climate and environmental efforts, and democracy"?

This is where it seems to me that Peder Hvelplund, Per Clausen and Jakob Ruggaard are expressing illusions that will not last long.

Is Europe not imperialist?

Peder Hvelplund writes: "Clearly, we are currently in a situation with at least 3 imperialist powers in the world, the USA, Russia and China. None of them want to contribute to maintaining an international legal order anchored in the UN system and international law."

I have to ask: Is there no imperialism in Europe? Aren't European countries imperialist? For example, France, Great Britain, Germany and Italy?

Historically, the European countries are the biggest imperialists. The British, the French, the Germans, the Spanish have been everywhere in the world. But also smaller countries like the Netherlands, Portugal, Italy and Denmark have had imperial ambitions, colonies, etc. The European countries have become weaker – but they still pursue an imperialist policy even in today's world.

They do this in relation to Africa, the Middle East – Palestine conflict, support for Israel, the attitude towards refugees (Frontex). The EU makes imperialist fishing agreements with Morocco, which has occupied Western Sahara, etc.

The representatives of the left simply must not forget this when they advocate arms production in Europe. We cannot eliminate contradictions in our politics by silencing them.

It also raises the question – what do we do if the EU produces weapons – but also sells them to Israel or uses them for French imperial control in Africa? Should we then vote against it?

Is democracy holding up in Europe?

Unfortunately, there is no guarantee of that. The far-right forces are strong in many European countries. In Sweden, the neo-Nazi party Sweden Democrats is the supporting party for the Swedish government. In Italy, the prime minister is neo-fascist. In Germany, the AfD has just received 20 percent of the vote, and there is a risk that they will at some point pressure the CDU/CSU into a collaboration.

In Austria, a neo-Nazi party is the largest. In Hungary, Orban is in power. In France, there is a highly unstable situation, where the centre around conservatives and liberals no longer has a majority in parliament – and both the left and the extreme right are very strong, and together could bring the government into a minority. There is a high risk that the extreme right could win a presidential election.

Peder Hvelplund explains precisely and compellingly the reasons for this condition in his post on Facebook:

"What undermines democracies and democratic institutions and feeds right-wing populism is when communities fail. When people experience insecurity and loneliness because their basic living conditions deteriorate, inequality explodes and the welfare that should help them disappears, while at the same time they see that the political will to confront tech and capital giants is completely absent."

The result is that faith in and hope for democracy as a transformative force disappears.

This must not happen. Therefore, it is imperative that, while we strengthen our ability to defend ourselves, we also strengthen what makes us have something to defend: our communities, human rights and democracy."

The only problem with Peder's formulation is that it doesn't just describe a possible future – it describes the present. In the EU, inequality has already exploded, basic living conditions have deteriorated, and there is no will to take any action against the capital giants.

The EU and the EU countries are not developing into the "freer, greener, more equal and safer societies" that Per and Jakob write they would like. Per Clausen knows this better than anyone from his work in the EU Parliament, of course.

Peder Hvelplund wants to defend us in "the dwindling European pillar of NATO". This raises the question of whether Turkey is part of that pillar? They are at least members of NATO and have one of NATO's strongest armies. Turkey is also opposed to Russia and therefore supports Ukraine to some extent. But Turkey's regime under Erdogan is authoritarian and repressive. Turkey also has its own imperialist projects in Syria and the Caucasus. Not the most obvious alliance partner.

Don't skip the intermediate calculations

We need to be completely clear about the situation. We must also describe it clearly. Per Clausen and Jakob Ruggaard do not do that. Neither does Peder Hvelplund. Nor does the top of SF when they write: "Europe must be able to defend itself and the values we believe in". Because what are the values that "we" share in Europe?

I agree with Jakob, Per and Peder and the SF leadership that we need weapons and a territorial defence of Denmark, but it is contradictory and will, for example, damage the climate - and there is a great risk of promoting capital interests that we do not like.

One cannot resolve all contradictions in a complicated situation; but we should see them and be clear about them.

The Ukraine war is not over yet

The SF's top sees no light on the security policy front: "There is no indication of improvements in the security policy picture or stabilisation as far as the eye can see. We must therefore have an honest and sober assessment of what our investments in our security require - and by extension, what the price will be."

Per Clausen and Jakob Ruggaard are also pessimistic, and they actually present Ukraine's defeat as something that has already happened: "We will be left with a Russia with ideological plans to re-establish a "Greater Russia" which was a central part of Putin's motivation for entering Ukraine. A Russia that has built lightning-fast supply lines throughout the war, spends over 7 percent of its GDP on the military, has a very large mobilisation for its army, which will no longer be maintained in Ukraine, and an economy that has been converted to a full-fledged war economy."

It is possible that it will happen, but it has not happened yet.

From day one, many believed that Ukraine had no chance against Russia and might as well surrender immediately. But Ukraine has successfully defended itself, preventing Russia from occupying 80% of the country, even though they have occupied 20%. Of course, the US's suspension of aid to Ukraine now puts the country in a difficult position – and perhaps the suspension will be permanent.

But it is far from certain that the end of the Ukrainian war will be a dirty "peace" dictated by right-wing radical powers, as Per and Jakob fear. That is a real risk. But it has not happened yet. It is also possible that Ukraine's defensive struggle will end with Russia having to withdraw – and that Ukraine will last longer in the war of attrition than Russia, which has used up a large part of the weapons reserves it had from the Soviet Union.

It is therefore crucial that the countries in Europe that support Ukraine continue to do so and replace the help that Ukraine can no longer count on from the United States.

The next few months will show how problematic it is for Ukraine, for example, that they no longer receive surveillance information from American satellites or can use Starlink as a communication path.

Is Russia a threat?

The answer to that question is both yes and no.

Yes, Russia is pursuing an aggressive imperialist policy towards its near abroad – i.e. the former Soviet republics. Especially towards Ukraine.

And yes, the tension between Russia and Western Europe and (until recently and perhaps again soon) the United States is strong.

But no, Russia does not currently have the capacity or need to attack Western Europe. Russia has tied up its entire standing army in the Ukraine war and does not have the extra resources to attack other countries. Russia's army is also seriously weakened after three years of war.

The reserves of weapons that were built up over many years during the Soviet era are depleted, or almost depleted. Weapons production is not sufficient to more than just continue the war in Ukraine. In some areas – tanks, armoured personnel carriers, anti-aircraft guns, aircraft – Russia produces less than it needs.

Russia's military had to reduce itself to almost nothing in Syria, and this contributed to the fall of the Assad regime. Russia's military weakening in the Caucasus was what allowed Azerbaijan to attack and take over the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Russia's population base is also far from sufficient to replace the losses Russia has suffered at the front. The cohorts of the nineties, which are the cohorts now at the front, are very small, and there are not many young, combat-ready men left.

So right now Russia has no capacity to attack Western Europe.

A poor peace in Ukraine could lead to a more aggressive Russia

The situation may change if Russia wins the Ukraine war and Ukraine is forced to make a bad peace.

We don't know what such a "peace" might look like. It might require a continued Russian occupation of large parts of Ukraine, requiring a lot of police and soldiers. In that case, Russia would still not have the capacity to attack others.

Otherwise, the Russian army might be released from its tasks in Ukraine – and in that case, Russia has approximately one million soldiers who are not needed at home and whose demobilisation would cause major problems.

Russia has also shifted to military production – and there is much to suggest that Putin's continued position as president presupposes that the war economy continues. So these are factors that will encourage Russia to act aggressively.

If Russia loses the Ukraine war and has to withdraw from the country – then there are greater chances of disarmament in Europe. In that case, one can hope for a regime change in Russia, and for Russia to develop in a democratic direction. This will provide opportunities to create a European security structure where people do not attack each other and can therefore disarm.

Are there other threats to Denmark?

There is the obvious and stated threat to the Commonwealth that the United States will take over Greenland, as Trump demands.

It is perhaps more obvious that he will implement it through blackmail and perhaps in a moderate form than an actual military occupation. The US has already had great influence and military bases in Greenland for a long time – and can easily gain even more control over, for example, raw material extraction, even without Greenland formally becoming part of the US.

Further out on the horizon, a conflict between the EU and China may threaten, or between the US and China, in which European countries will be involved. But there is time for European countries to pursue a policy that counteracts the escalation of the conflict.

Can Denmark buy weapons in Ukraine?

Denmark has already started investing in weapons production in Ukraine. Denmark has invested 4.2 billion. This is contributing to Ukraine's production of, for example, artillery shells and drones growing. At the moment, Ukraine needs all the weapons they can produce.

But when the war ends, it would be logical for Denmark to buy some of the production and continue the investment. It would also be logical to buy drones and draw on Ukraine's knowledge of how to defend against air attacks.

In fact, it is one of the smartest steps that Danish defence can take. Purchasing weapons from Ukraine at a reasonable price is also a way to support the country's reconstruction.

Concrete proposals for the left's defence policy

The Unity Party is not part of the defence compromise group and has no influence on Danish military policy. The party should not expect to be invited either. The other parties are simply not interested in the Unity Party being involved.

SF is involved in the defence agreements, but the party apparently has not had much influence on defence policy. SF's top leadership writes in Jyllands-Posten on February 14:

"We want welfare, we want work-life balance and fair pensions, we want green transition – and we want security through solid defence. All that is about our community and the responsibility to look after it. This is therefore not the time for irresponsible, inequality-creating tax breaks. We actually want the exact opposite from the government – namely a showdown with the tax freeze, so that we can both prioritise our defence and security and at the same time protect the community through investments in our welfare and green transition. We cannot risk that support for the large defence investments will fluctuate with the will and ability to simultaneously prioritise our welfare and the green transition."

Beautiful. But dear SF, that is not at all the policy the government is pursuing under Mette Frederiksen.

This raises the question: If the left wants a policy that unites welfare, green transition and defence – but is only offered defence, should they still vote for it?

But the left can gain influence by making demands from outside and influencing the public debate.

Here are some obvious points of action and requirements:

  1. American bases in Denmark are a bad idea because the United States threatens Denmark and is an aggressive imperialist power.
  2. It is a bad idea to buy weapons in the US. Especially if they – like the F-35 planes – only work when the US wants them to work.
  3. European countries are imperialistic – but some more than others – so buying in Sweden or Norway will be better than buying from France, for example. We should not have any illusions or create illusions that the EU is particularly democratic, that European countries will continue to be defenders of democracy, or that the EU defends the environment.
  4. Denmark must invest in public weapons production and research. We must advocate for weapons production to be state-owned.
  5. We work for a socially just payment for weapons production and the military. This must be done by rolling back tax breaks for the rich and increasing taxes on the same, as SF proposes.
  6. The left must support continued solidarity with Ukraine. It is the surest path to armament in Europe. A peace settlement on Ukrainian terms, with Russia withdrawing, is the surest path to disarmament in Europe.
  7. When the Ukraine war hopefully comes to an end, we must continue our cooperation with Ukraine to produce weapons and import some of them to Denmark, along with Ukraine's new weapons technologies within drones and air defence.
  8. We must work to ensure that European countries do not export weapons to dictatorships like Saudi Arabia and apartheid states like Israel.
  9. Whenever possible, we must support steps towards targeted disarmament – and we must maintain that this is our goal.

Fortunately, some of these points are already something that parties on the left and popular movements are actively promoting.