Andrei Vazyanau
Polls show that the majority of Belarusians oppose sending Belarusian soldiers to fight in the war against Ukraine. Dictator Alexander Lukashenko capitalizes on this sentiment, presenting himself as a protector of peace.
Vilnius. For a brief moment in 2020 and 2021, Belarus captured the attention of the European public. The fraudulent presidential elections sparked an unprecedented wave of protests and an equally unprecedented wave of repression, forcing hundreds of thousands to emigrate from a country that once had 9.4 million inhabitants.
The repression continues, but Belarus has largely vanished from the headlines, especially since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. For two months, Russian forces used Belarusian territory as a staging ground for the invasion and for six additional months as a launch site for missile attacks.
While the Belarusian army has not directly participated in combat, there is ample evidence of its involvement in maintaining Russian military equipment, supplying the Russian army, and aiding in the abduction of Ukrainian children. Belarus also hosted a so-called filtration camp for the detention of Ukrainian soldiers and civilians.
Conversely, Belarusian partisans carried out around 80 sabotage and disruption operations to slow down the movement of Russian military equipment toward Kyiv. In Ukraine, Belarusian volunteers formed the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment in March 2022, named after a 19th-century rebel against the Tsarist Empire, and have been fighting on the Ukrainian side ever since.
In state propaganda, Belarus’s non-participation in the war is not portrayed as a rift with Russia.
A Complex Reality
Despite this contradictory picture, the EU often simply categorizes Belarus as part of the Russian bloc. However, the reality is more complex. For Belarusian society, the fact that the country is not actively involved in the war is of fundamental importance, even if the reasons are not openly discussed. Unlike Ukraine, Belarus has no internally displaced people, no military funerals, no disabled veterans, and no cities destroyed by drone attacks. Furthermore, unlike in Russia, volunteering for the war against Ukraine has not become a path to financial advancement.
Polls indicate that most Belarusians believe their country is not at war and do not want it to be involved. Despite the regime's repressive environment, many Belarusians feel they still have something to lose. Lukashenko exploits this sentiment, presenting peace in Belarus as one of his regime's greatest achievements, alongside the preservation of Belarusian sovereignty. Polls also suggest that losing statehood to become part of Russia is widely unpopular.
The Economic Impact of the War
The regime does not openly position Belarus’s non-involvement in the war as opposition to Russia. Instead, propaganda emphasizes Belarus’s fragile peace against the backdrop of Ukraine’s destruction, portraying this peace as a product of the dictatorship’s protection. This narrative diverts attention from the daily political arrests and dismissals.
Unlike Ukrainians and Russians, Belarusians are not directly suffering from the war. The economy benefits from war-driven increases in production, including weapons for the Russian military, and trade with Russia. The dictatorship has also crushed pro-democracy aspirations, arguing that their success would inevitably lead to involvement in the war. While the regime does not incite hatred against Ukrainians, it targets its domestic political opponents, branding them as traitors.
Western Perceptions and Sanctions
The feeling of being unaffected by the war shapes Belarusians’ perceptions of Western countries, especially the sanctions imposed on Belarus. Travel restrictions are a particular concern, as hundreds of thousands of Belarusians live separated from their families due to forced emigration.
Since 2022, many EU countries have imposed restrictions on tourist and other visas for Belarusian passport holders. The closure of consular offices in Minsk has made obtaining a visa significantly more difficult, often requiring travel to Russia. For instance, the German embassy in Belarus reportedly takes up to eight months to provide an appointment for a visa application, with actual appointments scheduled over a year later.
Beyond visa issues, other actions reinforce the perception that the EU and the West disregard Belarus. The 2023 withdrawal of Tinder, ceding the market to Russian dating apps, and the refusal to authorize Belarusian translations of the Harry Potter series in 2024 are examples. Although permission was eventually granted, the books could only be sold within the EU, not in Belarus.
In August 2024, when Russia and Western countries exchanged political prisoners for Russian agents, Belarusian opposition figures were excluded, even though Belarus released a German citizen. Such incidents are exploited by Lukashenko and his supporters, exacerbating the perception of Western indifference.
The Outlook for Belarus
The Lukashenko regime seeks to gain concessions from Western governments, such as the release of political prisoners or expanded visa-free access for EU citizens, in exchange for not sending Belarusian troops to fight in Ukraine. Domestically, the regime attempts to maintain military, political, and economic independence from Russia by strengthening economic ties with China and other Asian countries.
In the EU and among parts of the Belarusian democracy movement, there is a belief that sanctions should remain in place until Belarus takes a decisive stand. However, many Belarusians likely feel they have taken no side, fearing that doing so would bring war to their soil, regardless of the likelihood.
The uncomfortable truth is that, on this issue, Lukashenko’s interests align with those of many Belarusians, even if their visions for the country differ greatly. Many entered the new year with the sobering realization that things could still get much worse.